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a b s t r a c t 
Having a large number of applications in the marketplace is considered a critical success factor for software 
ecosystems. The number of applications has been claimed to determine which ecosystems holds the great- 
est competitive advantage and will eventually dominate the market. This paper investigates the inﬂuence of 
developer multi-homing (i.e., participating in more than one ecosystem) in three leading mobile application 
ecosystems. Our results show that when regarded as a whole, mobile application ecosystems are single- 
homing markets. The results further show that 3% of all developers generate more than 80% of installed ap- 
plications and that multi-homing is common among these developers. Finally, we demonstrate that the most 
installed content actually comprises only a small number of the potential value propositions. The results thus 
imply that attracting and maintaining developers of superstar applications is more critical for the survival 
of a mobile application ecosystem than the overall number of developers and applications. Hence, the mo- 
bile ecosystem is unlikely to become a monopoly. Since exclusive contracts between application developers 
and mobile application ecosystems are rare, multi-homing is a viable component of risk management and a 
publishing strategy. The study advances the theoretical understanding of the inﬂuence of multi-homing on 
competition in software ecosystems. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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0. Introduction 
Competition in the mobile communication industry has been ar-
ued as turning from “a battle of devices to a war of ecosystems”. 1 
ence, the sheer number of applications in the marketplace has
ecome increasingly important in marketing new mobile devices
see e.g., Chen, 2010; Reuters, 2012; Lee, 2015; Smith, 2015 ). All
eading mobile operating system providers have established appli-
ation marketplaces such as Google Play, App Store by Apple and
icrosoft’s Windows Phone Store (previously Windows Phone Mar-
etplace) with the aim of enticing a large number of content
roviders (e.g., application developers) in order to create their mobile
pplication ecosystems. The logic behind establishing the ecosystems
s grounded on the theory of network externalities ( Katz and Shapiro,
985 ). Due to network externalities, a large number of application∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +358 2 333 8534; fax: +358 2 333 8900. 
E-mail addresses: sthyry@utu.ﬁ (S. Hyrynsalmi), arho.suominen@vtt.ﬁ (A. Suomi- 
en), matti.mantymaki@utu.ﬁ (M. Mäntymäki). 
1 Stephen Elop, the former Executive Vice President of Microsoft’s Devices and Ser- 
ices and (at the time of the comment) the CEO of Nokia Corporation, speech at D9, 
une 1, 2011 
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164-1212/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article undeevelopers within the ecosystem is expected to lead to a large num-
er of applications that, in turn, will attract customers and drive de-
ice sales, leading to a virtuous circle ( Holzer and Ondrus, 2011 ). 
In this study, the concept of ‘mobile application ecosystem’ refers
o “an interconnected system comprising an ecosystem orchestra-
or, mobile application developers, and mobile device owners, all of
hom are connected through a marketplace platform” ( Hyrynsalmi,
eppänen and Suominen, 2014 ). Hence, a mobile application ecosys-
em is a derivate of the more general concept of a ‘software ecosys-
em’ ( Jansen, Finkelstein, and Brinkkemper, 2009; Bosch, 2009;
anikas and Hanssen, 2013 ). 
The emergence of ecosystems has increased the complexity of
evenue models, but also cooperation, competition and co-opetition
etween and within the ecosystems. The traditional value chain
pproaches ( Porter and Millar, 1985; Porter, 2004 ), employed to de-
cribe the telecommunications industry ( Barnes, 2002; Maitland,
auer, and Westerveld, 2002; Funk, 2009 ), have been increasingly
eplaced by ecosystem approaches ( Basole and Karla, 2011, 2012;
asole, Russel, Huhtamäki, and Rubens, 2012 ). 
The increased complexity calls for a better understand-
ng of the boundaries and structures of the ecosystems (e.g.,r the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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aJansen et al. 2009; Gueguen and Isckia, 2011; Hanssen, 2012 ). Prior
research has investigated the success factors of the iPhone ( Laugesen
and Yuan, 2010; West and Mace, 2010 ), the distribution and capture
of value in the mobile phone supply chains ( Dedrick, Kraemer, and
Linden, 2011 ), developers’ perspectives on the mobile application
markets ( Lee, Lee, Shim, and Choi, 2010; Holzer and Ondrus, 2011;
Schultz, Zarnekow, Wulf, and Nguyen, 2011 ), the dynamics of the
application marketplaces ( Järvi and Kortelainen, 2011; Hyrynsalmi,
Suominen, and Seppänen, 2013; Jansen and Bloemendal, 2013 ),
standard wars and platform battles ( Heinrich, 2014; Gallagher,
2012; van de Kaa and de Vries, 2015; van de Kaa, van den Ende,
de Vries and van Heck,. 2011 ) and cooperation within ecosystems
( Gueguen and Isckia, 2011 ). However, there is a dearth of theo-
retically grounded literature offering foresight on the competition
between software ecosystems that could guide mobile application
developers to optimize their publishing strategies. 
To ﬁll this void in the literature, this study draws on theory about
platform competition ( Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006;
Sun and Tse, 2009 ) and investigates application developers’ multi-
homing (i.e., the situation in which developers publish applications
in two or more ecosystems) as well as the content of the most down-
loaded applications. According to the extant research, the success of
network platforms, such as mobile application ecosystems, is deter-
mined by whether the market is single-homing or multi-homing in
terms of volume ( Sun and Tse, 2009 ). In other words, if application
developers prefer to offer their products in one ecosystem, i.e. single-
home, the market as a whole will, over time, develop into a monopoly
of the leading ecosystem. 
To gain a more accurate insight into the competition between
software ecosystems, we advance the research on the inﬂuence of
multi-homing on platform competition in two-sided markets ( Sun
and Tse, 2009 ). Software ecosystems are two-sided markets since two
groups of agents, e.g. consumers and application developers operate
in the market. Second, we contribute to the research on competition
dynamics in the telecommunications industry ( He, Lim, and Wong,
2006 ). Our point of departure is that, because only a small number of
all applications available in the ecosystems are actually actively used
by customers, consequently only a small number of all developers
generate the majority of downloads. Thus, we particularly focus on
the role of this group of developers that we deﬁne as ‘ nucleus devel-
opers ’ since they have a central role in the success of an ecosystem.
Hence, we shed light on the bargaining powers of the nucleus de-
velopers and ecosystem orchestrators such as Apple, Google, and Mi-
crosoft that host and maintain the ecosystems ( Manikas and Hansen,
2013 ). 
Against this backdrop, we empirically study more than one million
applications from all three mobile application ecosystems, examining
the level of multi-homing at the levels of the (1) mobile application
ecosystem and (2) nucleus developer. We use web crawling to collect
the data, and string matching algorithms to pair applications and de-
velopers of different ecosystems. We then move to examining how
the dynamics of multi-homing change by analyzing the nucleus de-
velopers to determine whether they are particular to multi-homing
and, thus, less dependent on a single ecosystem orchestrator. Finally,
we investigate the content of the most successful applications and
show that the content, i.e., the value propositions of the most pop-
ular applications can be classiﬁed into a relatively small number of
categories. 
Our results demonstrate that just three percent of the develop-
ers generate more than 80% of all installed applications. In addition,
the results show that when regarded as a whole, only a small subset
of application developers multi-home. However, among the nucleus
developers, multi-homing is common. This indicates that mobile ap-
plication ecosystems can be considered both single-homing and a
multi-homing market depending on the level of analysis. We term
markets like these ‘ multilevel two-sided markets ’. Taken as a whole,ur results offer an explanation as to why several competing mo-
ile application ecosystems can co-exist. For professional application
evelopers, who have the resources to publish their applications in
ultiple ecosystems, this study implies that multi-homing is a viable
omponent of risk management and a publishing strategy. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. After this
ntroductory section, we present the theoretical foundation of the
tudy. The third section includes the methodology and data collec-
ion process. The results are presented in the fourth section. The ﬁfth
ection comprises discussion on the results, implications for research
nd practice, and also limitations and avenues for further inquiry. The
ast section concludes the study. 
. Background 
The number of application developers in mobile application
cosystems generally increases the number of applications available
n the marketplace and, hence, the value of the ecosystem to the cus-
omer, and vice versa ( Holzer and Ondrus, 2011; Cenamor, Usero and
ernandex, 2013 ). Therefore, it is paramount for ecosystem orches-
rators to involve both customers and developers in their respective
cosystems. Thus, the success of an ecosystem is dependent on both
evelopers and customers. As a result, mobile application ecosys-
ems can be termed ‘two-sided markets’ ( Rochet and Tirole, 2003;
rmstrong, 2006 ). 
Two-sided markets are economic platforms with beneﬁcial cross-
roup network effects ( Armstrong, 2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2003;
arker and Van Alstyne, 2005 ). In other words, the value of participat-
ng in a platform for agents in one group depends on the number of
articipants in another group. Network effects can accrue from direct
xternalities, whereby utility increases as the number of users con-
uming increases; and indirect externalities, whereby the demand
or a product depends on the existence of another product ( Katz and
hapiro, 1985 ). Hence, in the mobile application ecosystems context,
wo-sided markets can be conceptualized as markets where one or
everal economic platforms enable interaction between customers,
evelopers, and an orchestrator ( Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006;
rmstrong, 2006 ). 
To date, the managerial and scholarly debate on two-sided mar-
ets has followed the logic of the credit card business, where the ab-
olute number of merchants accepting a credit card — or the number
f applications available in the marketplace — determines the value
f the credit card for the end user (see e.g., Chen, 2010; Reuters, 2012;
ee, 2015; Smith, 2015 ). However, this approach considers all appli-
ations equal and thus ignores the qualitative aspects of the market
ynamics. Prior studies have examined winner-takes-all competition
 Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne 2006 ), i.e., a situation where
ne platform ultimately wins the platform race. Econometric mod-
ling studies, such as Tse (2006) and Sun and Tse (2009) have created
odels of platform competition that emphasize the role of single- or
ulti-homing 
As there are several competing mobile application ecosystems,
ustomers and developers can participate in more than one ecosys-
em. Participation in more than one economic platform at a time is
ermed ‘multi-homing’ ( Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006;
un and Tse, 2009 ). Multi-homing in two-sided markets is a situation
here more than one two-sided platforms exist in the same market,
nd the two sides of the market (e.g., buyers and sellers) are free to
perate in several platforms. For example, an application developer
s multi-homing when it offers products in both the Apple App Store
nd Google Play. Similarly, a customer is multi-homing when he/she
tilizes several mobile devices operating in different platforms; how-
ver, with a single mobile device, the customer can typically partici-
ate in only one ecosystem. Single-homing is the opposite situation:
n actor participates only in one ecosystem. 
S. Hyrynsalmi et al. / The Journal of Systems and Software 111 (2016) 119–127 121 
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2 The scripts will be made available to other researchers by contacting the corre- 
sponding author. 
3 Python v2.7.3. documentation – http://docs.python.org/library/diﬄib.html Sellers engage in multi-homing to gain access to larger potential
arkets ( Rochet and Tirole, 2006 ), to offer their products to the same
ustomers across different platforms, and to reduce dependency on a
ingle market and orchestrator ( Idu, van de Zande, and Jansen, 2011 ).
owever, multi-homing also generates costs associated with convert-
ng a product to different platforms, additional marketing effort s, and
lso maintaining the product for several platforms ( Eisenmann et al.,
006 ). 
Prior research has focused on software vendors’ multi-homing in
onsole games marketplaces ( Landsman and Stremersch, 2011 ), Soft-
are as a Service (SaaS) marketplaces ( Burkard, Draisbach, Widjaja,
nd Buxmann, 2011; Burkard, Widjaja, and Buxmann, 2012 ), and also
ithin Apple’s ecosystem ( Idu et al., 2011 ). In their study on the gam-
ng console market, Landsman and Stremersch (2011) found that the
ulti-homing of games has a negative effect on sales at the mar-
etplace level, although the negative effect decreases when a plat-
orm matures or gains market share. Idu et al. (2011) investigated the
Phone, iPad, and Mac software marketplaces, and found that, out of
he top 1,800 applications, 17.2% were multi-homed in two market-
laces and 2.1% in all three marketplaces. 
In their theoretical analysis of competitive advantage in two-sided
arkets, Sun and Tse (2009) highlighted the importance of the dis-
inction between multi-homing and single-homing in determining
he winner among competing platforms. Drawing on dynamic sys-
ems models, Sun and Tse (2009) argued that, in the context of single-
oming, only the largest network will survive and that network size is
he critical factor in determining the winner among competing plat-
orms. This is due to the fact that in a two-sided market, network
articipants become a critical resource for the platform orchestrator
 Sun and Tse, 2009 ). By drawing on two dynamic systems models,
un and Tse (2009) concluded that a multi-homing market is able to
ustain several platforms, whereas a single-homing market is prone
o becoming dominated by a single platform. 
However, Sun and Tse (2009) pointed out that their analysis of
latform competition focused on the quantity of network partici-
ants but did not address the quality of participants. This issue is
articularly important in the context of mobile application ecosys-
ems, since most of the installations in Google Play were generated
rom a small set of applications ( Hyrynsalmi, Suominen, Mäkilä, and
nuutila 2012 ). 
In the following section we pay special attention to this subset of
pplications as well as their developers. In doing so, this study moves
eyond a volume driven analysis of ecosystem competition to ana-
yze the value propositions made within different platforms and to
ncover single- or multi-homing patterns at a value proposition level
ather than a developer level. 
. Research process 
We collected two datasets for this study: (1) the data of over mil-
ion applications available in the marketplaces of the three major mo-
ile application ecosystems (described in Section 3.1 ); and (2) the
ost popular applications in these marketplaces ( Section 3.3 ).
he ﬁrst set of data is used to study the overall multi-homing rates in
he market while the second set gives us an insight into the top appli-
ations and their developers. We analyzed the empirical data in three
tages. First, we identiﬁed the multi-homing of all applications and
evelopers from the three marketplaces ( Section 3.2 ). In the second
tage, we analyzed the multi-homing patterns of the nucleus devel-
pers ( Section 3.3 .). In the third stage, we conducted a content analy-
is of the nucleus developers’ applications to determine whether they
ould be classiﬁed into qualitatively similar content categories. 
.1. Application data collection 
In total, empirical data were collected on 1,295,320 applications
rom the three ecosystems, Google Play, Apple’s App Store, and Win-ows Phone Store, during December 2012 (Windows Phone Store)
nd January 2013 (Google Play and Apple App Store). Our data shows
hat Apple’s App Store had 654,759 applications made by 149,032 de-
elopers, Google Play had 542,955 applications made by 88,144 de-
elopers, and Windows Phone Store had 94,606 applications made
y 25,833 developers. 
We employed a web crawler 2 (see e.g., Castillo, 2004; Olston and
ajork, 2010 ) utilizing the Python programming language to gather
he application data. The script began from the front page of each
arketplace and went through all of the listed pages. It stored all the
pplication identiﬁers — available on each web page — into a queue of
pplications to be studied. Duplicate values were removed from the
ueue. The program also collected various attributes for each identi-
ed application from their public proﬁles in the marketplace, which
ere stored in a database. Although the available information varied
n each marketplace, as a minimum, the name, developer, and price
f each application were captured. 
.2. Detecting multi-homing 
Following Landsman and Stremersch (2011) , we investigated
ulti-homing by dividing it into two levels: seller- and platform-level
ulti-homing. Seller-level multi-homing is a situation where a par-
icular seller (i.e., developer) offers its products to customers in more
han one ecosystem. Platform-level multi-homing takes place when
 particular application is available in several ecosystems. A devel-
per can publish different products in different ecosystems, and a
articular product can be published on different platforms by differ-
nt developers. The latter is a quite common approach in, e.g., video
ame markets where the porting of a popular video game from one
onsole to other is carried out by another game studio. In mobile ap-
lication ecosystems, there are a few similar instances. For example,
icrosoft Corporation is the publisher of the Facebook application in
he Windows Phone ecosystem and Research in Motion Limited is the
ublisher of the Facebook application in the Blackberry World (pre-
iously Blackberry App World) marketplace, which reveals that the
ctual implementation of front-end applications was performed by
hird-party developers (i.e. by the orchestrators themselves in these
ases). Respectively, Facebook and Facebook Inc are the publishers of
acebook applications in the Android and iOS ecosystems. 
We implemented a set of Python scripts to identify multi-homing
evelopers (i.e., seller-level multi-homing) and applications (i.e.,
latform-level multi-homing). We utilized two matching strategies,
amely exact matching and approximate matching. Exact matching
equires that the two names under comparison are the same, char-
cter by character. However, the comparison is case-insensitive. Ap-
roximate matching allows a particular level of dissimilarity in the
ames under comparison. This strategy is useful in situations where,
or example, a developer has employed pre- or postﬁxes such as ‘Inc.’
r ‘GmbH’ in one marketplace but omitted them in another. For ex-
mple, ‘Rovio’ is the publisher of Angry Birds in Windows Phone
tore, while ‘Rovio Mobile Ltd.’ is the publisher in Google Play and the
pple App Store. We used Levenshtein distance ( Levenshtein, 1966 )
o measure the similarity of two names and employed Python’s diﬄib
ibrary 3 for comparisons. 
We decided to utilize these two matching strategies because the
xact matching gives the lower bound for the total number of multi-
oming cases but misses some cases as discussed above. The approx-
mate matching, in turn, detects these cases but can also create false
ositive matches. We iterated different similarity thresholds in the
pproximate matching process until there was a clear increase in
alse positive matches that was determined via visual examination.
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Table 1 
Platform-level multi-homing in three application ecosystems. 
In all three ecosystems 
Apple App Store & 
Windows Phone Store 
Google Play & Windows 
Phone Store 
Google Play & Apple 
App Store 
Share of multi-homed 
applications 
Exact 430 1 ,092 1 ,886 16 ,578 1 .7% 
Approx. (85%) 531 1 ,348 2 ,184 21 ,153 2 .1% 
Approx. (75%) 645 1 ,586 2 ,464 24 ,598 2 .5% 
Approx. (50%) 1,453 2 ,698 3 ,963 30 ,930 3 .2% 
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000
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Fig. 1. Cumulative percentages of application installations in Google Play for the top 
3,0 0 0 developers (3.3% of all developers) with three estimation methods (lower bound, 
median of bounds, and upper bound). 
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t  For each iteration, we randomly selected a dozen of the paired ap-
plications and examined whether the created pairs were correct. As a
result, the approximate matching offers an upper bound for the num-
ber of multi-homed applications. The actual number of multi-homers
falls within this interval. 
3.3. Data collection of ecosystem nucleuses 
As pointed out by Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012) , most of the installa-
tions in Google Play were generated by a small set of applications.
Therefore, we pay special attention to this subset of applications,
also referred to as ‘superstars’ ( Landsman and Stremersch, 2011 ), and
we consider developers of these superstar applications as the ‘nu-
cleus developers’ of the respective ecosystems. It should be noted
that while a keystone actor, i.e. “an active leader in the ecosystem”
( Basole, 2009 ), can also be a nucleus developer, the opposite is sel-
dom the case. 
To examine the nucleus developers’ role in the ecosystems, we ex-
amined the 3,0 0 0 developers’ cumulative shares of the total number
of application downloads in the Google Play application marketplace.
We calculated the number of installations from the application
dataset — taken from the web crawling of Google Play — with es-
timated lower and upper bounds and also median values. That is,
when an application’s installation category is ‘5-10’, values 5, 10, and
7 were respectively employed as the installation counts. 4 Fig. 1 be-
low clearly shows that the top 3,0 0 0 developers (3.3% of all) of de-
velopers generate the majority (i.e., 85.0 to 85.6%) of all installations
in the marketplace. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, this ﬁnding holds
with all three estimation methods. Furthermore, the top 25 develop-
ers alone account for approximately one-ﬁfth of all downloads in the
marketplace. 
As drawing an exact line between the superstars and other highly
successful applications is problematic and because not all mar-
ketplaces publish information regarding installation or download
counts, we decided to utilize the top 100 application listings as a
proxy that gives a relatively good estimate of the superstar appli-
cations. The marketplaces publish different top application listings4 Application marketplaces do not offer information about the exact number of in- 
stallations. dreely in their webpages. 5 For example, all marketplaces offer a list
f the most installed free applications. 
We examined the top 100 application listings from free and paid
pplications for each marketplace. Furthermore, for Google Play and
he Apple App Store, we also examined the top grossing listings that
in addition to revenue earned from direct sales — also includes rev-
nues earned from different in-application payments. We collected
nformation on 622 unique applications from the overall top 800 ap-
lications, and then manually determined whether the producers of
hese applications were present in several ecosystems. In concrete
erms, we manually investigated the proﬁle information of these ap-
lications in the marketplaces, on the developers’ web pages and in
ress releases as well as newspaper and magazine articles about the
eveloper to detect whether the developer was multi-homing. 
. Results 
This section presents the ﬁndings of the study. First, we show the
verall level of multi-homing among all applications. Second, we fo-
us on application developers and examine their multi-homing be-
avior. Third, we investigate the multi-homing rates of superstar ap-
lications and nucleus developers. Fourth, we analyze the content of
hese superstar applications and their value propositions. 
.1. Platform-level multi-homing 
The results demonstrate that the share of multi-homed applica-
ions from the overall number of applications is small. Table 1 shows
he results of platform-level multi-homing with exact and approx-
mate matching strategies, and also the results of three similarity
hreshold values for approximate matching. 
Although the number of multi-homed applications doubles when
he similarity requirement is loosened, the overall share of multi-
omed applications still varies from only 1.7 to 3.2% of all applica-
ions. For a single ecosystem, the number of multi-homed applica-
ions varies only a little: 2.6 to 4.9% for Apple App Store, 2.6 to 5.3%
or Windows Phone Store, and 3.3 to 6.2% for Google Play. Similarly,
he number of applications available for all three ecosystems remains
nder 0.14% in all cases. 
We tested different similarity requirement values and found that
0% similarity was the lowest without a clear increase in false posi-
ive matches. Nevertheless, the share of multi-homing applications
emained low; for example, 3.5% of all unique applications with a
hreshold value of 40%. In sum, our results demonstrate that the
ulti-homing publishing strategy is only employed by a small num-
er of developers and, typically, for only a small set of applications. 
Google Play and Apple App Store host the majority of multi-
oming applications, which is not surprising as the two ecosystems
ave larger volumes of applications and developers than Windows
hone Store. Interestingly, however, almost three times more devel-
pers have published in both Google Play and Windows Phone Store
han in Apple App Store and Windows Phone Store. This observa-
ion might be due to the different publication processes utilized by5 See e.g. http://www.windowsphone.com/en-us/store/top-paid-apps for the Win- 
ows Phone Store’s top purchased applications. 
S. Hyrynsalmi et al. / The Journal of Systems and Software 111 (2016) 119–127 123 
Table 2 
Percentages of platform- and seller-level multi-homing utilization in different top 100 
listings in three ecosystems. The top grossing listings includes applications that have the 
highest in-application sales. 
Platform-level N Seller-level N 
Apple App Store Free 48 .0% 100 55 .2% 87 
Paid 45 .0% 100 42 .3% 71 
Grossing 50 .0% 100 62 .0% 71 
Total 47 .0% 253 50 .3% 175 
Google Play Free 55 .0% 100 60 .0% 80 
Paid 43 .0% 100 42 .0% 81 
Grossing 58 .0% 100 69 .1% 68 
Total 50 .9% 271 51 .6% 192 
Windows Phone Store Free 47 .0% 100 46 .8% 79 
Paid 41 .0% 100 43 .4% 83 
Total 43 .4% 196 43 .7% 151 
N = number of applications and application developers in each listing. Windows Phone 
Store does not publish the top grossing listing. 
Apple App
Store
135,788
Google
Play
75,000
Windows
Phone
Store
23,055
644
11,483 1,117
1,017
Fig. 2. Venn diagram of seller-level multi-homing, based on the exact matching strat- 
egy, in three application ecosystems. 
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a  he orchestrators ( Campbell and Ahmed, 2011; Cuadrado and Dueñas,
012 ) as Google Play and Windows Phone Store have more open ac-
eptance processes than Apple App Store. 
.2. Seller-level multi-homing 
In brief, the results reveal that seller-level multi-homing is more
ommon than platform-level multi-homing, yet the degree of seller
ulti-homing is also small. Fig. 2 illustrates the studied seller-level
ulti-homing in the three ecosystems with a Venn diagram based on
he results of the exact matching method. With this matching strat-
gy, we found 248,104 unique developers. From these, 14,261 (i.e.,
.75%) were published in at least two marketplaces, and only 644 (i.e.,
.26%) were published in all three studied ecosystems. For a single
cosystem, the number of multi-homers varies from 8.8% for the Ap-
le App Store to 10.8% for Windows Phone Store and 15.0% for Google
lay. 
With the approximate matching method, a threshold of 95%
aised the share of multi-homers to 7.2% and the share of the de-
elopers who work in all three ecosystems to 0.36%. Although thehreshold values under 95% found new true positive matches, there
as a considerable increase in the number of visually observed false
ositives. 
.3. Nucleus developers, superstar applications, and multi-homing 
To study the superstar applications, we examined eight top 100
pplications’ listings in the three ecosystems, from which we iden-
iﬁed 622 unique applications. Of this group, a considerable share,
44 (i.e., 39.2%), were multi-homed. Table 2 presents the num-
er of multi-homing applications for each studied top list in more
etail. These superstar applications were published by 429 appli-
ation developers, and the number of developers producing the
ontent for each ecosystem is even smaller: the top 800 applica-
ions were published by 175 developers in Apple App Store, 194
n Google Play, and by 152 in Windows Phone Store. Out of these
29 developers, a signiﬁcant number (n = 183; i.e., 42.7%) were
ulti-homing. 
In addition, we studied 100 developers that generated the most
nstallations in the Google Play marketplace (i.e., the top one hun-
red developers from Fig. 1 ). Although only 47 of these were in the
op applications’ developer list, 52 out of 100 developers were multi-
oming in at least two mobile application ecosystems. While only
oogle Play offers these ﬁgures, the analysis shows that the mag-
itude of multi-homing among top developers is similar across the
hree ecosystems. Finally, when compared to the overall rate of seller-
nd platform-level multi-homing, the shares of superstar applica-
ions and nucleus developers are considerably higher regardless of
he employed approach. 
In the third and ﬁnal stage of the analysis, we investigated the
ontent of the superstar applications. First, we examined the 622 ap-
lications and wrote a short description of each application and the
peciﬁc functionality — i.e. the application’s value proposition — that
he application offers to the user. Thereafter, we classiﬁed applica-
ions with common characteristics in order to form a category. For
xample, ‘personalization,’ ‘games,’ and ‘instant messaging’ were de-
ned as categories. This process of analyzing and coding textual data
s typical for the content analysis of textual data (see e.g. Krippendorf,
013 ). The results of the content analysis are presented in
able 3. 
In Table 3 , the Game category is by far the largest, containing
pplications such as Angry Birds and Clash of Clans among others.
acebook is classiﬁed under Social Network Service (SNS) front-end
nd Facebook Messenger under Short message. Instagram is in the
econd largest category of Photo and video editing. Google Maps
nd Earth were classiﬁed under Maps. Altogether, the majority
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Table 3 
Classiﬁcation of superstar applications based on the content provided. 
Category N Description Example 
Game 367 Classiﬁed as games by the developers Clash of Clans 
Photo and video editing 36 Offer different kinds of effect and editing option for videos and/or photos Instagram 
Personalization 34 Change user interface elements; e.g., backgrounds, ring tones Superuser Elite 
SNS front-end 19 Front-end for social network services for e.g., Twitter, Facebook Facebook 
Music/video player 18 Applications that play music and/or videos Spotify 
Assistant, calendar, & notes 16 Small tools utilized to help everyday life; e.g. reminders, listing tools MyCalendar 
Mobile front-end for Internet content 15 Speciﬁc front-ends for web content such as Wikipedia ESPN, SportsCenter Feed 
Short message 11 For sending and receiving short messages WeChat 
Shopping front-end 10 Mobile speciﬁc front-ends for e-Shopping services Ebay 
VoIP service 8 Voice-over-IP applications Skype 
Flashlight 8 Flashlight applications Flashﬂight Free 
Oﬃce 7 Oﬃce-like applications TurboScan 
Maps 6 Offer different map services Google Maps 
Weight loss 6 Offer weight tracking and tips for weight loss Weight Watchers Mobileloss 
Sleep application 6 Plays music that should help one to sleep Sleep Bug Pro 
Book-on-demand reader 5 Readers for book-on-demand services iBooks 
Voice recognition 4 Utilize voice recognition SoundHound 
Dictionary & translate 4 Dictionary and translating applications Translator 
Sport tracker 4 For tracking sport activities Endomondo Sports Tracker Pro 
Dating 3 Dating services MeetMe 
Search 3 Different search services Google 
Cloud storage 3 Enables saving and retrieving content from cloud services Google Drive 
Music making 2 For playing and recording music instruments GarageBand 
Bank front-end 2 Front-ends for banking services Bank of America 
Backup 2 Enables storage and retrieval of phone data My Backup Pro 
Barcode reader 2 For reading barcodes Barcode Scanner 
AR applications 2 Augmented reality applications Sky Map Free 
Misc. 19 Applications that could not be merged with any other application to form a category Accurate Tuner Pro 
Total 622 
N = number of occurrences. 
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pof applications were easily classiﬁed into the categories and only
19 applications were put into the miscellaneous category, contain-
ing applications such as GasBuddy, Oﬃcial eBay Android App and
Longman Dictionary. 
The content analysis revealed that the majority of the superstar
applications (i.e., 59%) were different kinds of games. In addition,
there were rather speciﬁc categories among the superstar applica-
tions. For example, the listing includes eight different applications
that turn a phone into a ﬂashlight and six applications that play
sounds that aim to help send a user to sleep. Interestingly, we did not
observe any major differences between the three competing ecosys-
tems as the relative percentages of the categories are similar among
each of the three mobile application ecosystems. 
In summary, the majority of the most popular content, such as
Facebook, weather apps and the most popular games, is either of-
fered by the original developers or imitated by other developers in
all three ecosystems. That is, the levels of multi-homing among su-
perstar applications and nucleus developers are rather high. This ob-
servation contrasts with prior studies that suggested that the level of
multi-homing is, at most, small ( Boudreau, 2007, 2012 ). Altogether,
our results have several implications for both research and practice
that are discussed in the following section. 
5. Discussion 
This section presents the key ﬁndings of the study. Thereafter, we
compare our results against prior theory on multi-homing in two-
sided markets ( Sun and Tse 2009 ), and then on the often-stated ar-
gument concerning the importance of a large developer base and
the volume of complementary products to the success of an ecosys-
tem ( Cenamor et al., 2013 ). This is followed by a discussion, from a
more practice-oriented perspective, on the effect of multi-homing on
the competition between software ecosystems. We conclude by dis-
cussing the limitations of the study and offering avenues for further
research. .1. Key ﬁndings 
We have condensed the results of the study into three key ﬁnd-
ngs: 
1. When looking at the market as a whole, mobile application
ecosystems are single-homing markets. 
2. However, when focusing only on the most downloaded applica-
tions we ﬁnd that the mobile application ecosystems are multi-
homing markets. 
3. The value propositions of the superstar applications are relatively
similar across the ecosystems. 
irst, our results imply that when looking at the market for mobile
pplications as a whole, it is a single-homing market. As indicated
y our results from both the platform- and seller-level multi-homing
ubsets, only a small set of applications (i.e., 1.7 to 3.2%) and develop-
rs (i.e., 5.8 to 7.2%) are multi-homing. 
Second, when looking at the most popular applications and the
evelopers of these applications, the market is a multi-homing mar-
et. Our results indicate that multi-homing rates among the most
opular applications, that is, superstars (i.e., 39.2%) and their nucleus
evelopers (i.e., 42.7%), are almost ten time that of their competi-
ors when compared to all other applications and developers in the
arket. 
Third, our content analysis of the superstar applications in all
hree mobile application ecosystems offers empirical information on
he value propositions in the mobile applications market. Our re-
ults show that superstars are largely basic applications such as ﬂash-
ight and short message services. Furthermore, a considerable share
f these applications are actually only front-ends for services offered
n the web, which implies that third parties can replicate the con-
ent of many superstar applications with relative ease. In addition,
ur analysis of superstar applications indicated that the actual set of
ucleus developers appears to be rather small and is mainly com-
rised of game producers. 
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t  .2. Theoretical implications 
Our study accumulates understanding on software ecosystems in
hree areas. First, our research offers novel insight into the inﬂuence
f multi-homing on competition between ecosystems. Our ﬁndings
ndicate that the level of multi-homing differs considerably between
he overall market and superstar applications. According to Sun and
se’s (2009 ) theory of platform competition, a multi-homing market
an sustain several competing ecosystems; however, a single-homing
arket eventually evolves into only one prevailing ecosystem. When
xamining multi-homing at the level of the whole content of the
hree ecosystems, our ﬁndings support Sun and Tse’s (2009 ) asser-
ion that the market would evolve into one dominant ecosystem. 
At the same time, our results also indicate that multi-homing is
uch more common for superstar applications and nucleus devel-
pers. According to Sun and Tse (2009) , this implies that the mar-
et would be able to sustain more than one ecosystem. Overall, our
esearch advances Sun and Tse’s (2009 ) model of platform compe-
ition by emphasizing that multi-homing can manifest differently
ithin a single group of actors in the market. However, further work
s needed to understand multilevel two-sided markets in which the
ctors’ multi-homing behavior and their value for the ecosystem dif-
ers substantially between the small number of nucleus developers
nd the vast majority of developers. 
Second, our ﬁndings demonstrate that the quality of application
evelopers is far more important than their number. As our results
how, only 3% of application developers are responsible for more than
0% of installations in a single ecosystem. Hence, after reaching a cer-
ain critical threshold, the quality of developers is far more important
n terms of generating downloads from the marketplace. Therefore,
rom the mobile application ecosystem orchestrators’ vantage point,
ttracting and maintaining nucleus developers is far more important
han having a large developer base per se. 
As a result, we depart from Sun and Tse (2009) who emphasized
he sheer size of the two sides of the market as a decisive factor in
latform competition. In addition, our ﬁndings differ from the extant
esearch (e.g., Yamakami, 2010; Holzer and Ondrus, 2011; Schultz et
l., 2011 ) that, grounded on network externalities ( Katz and Shapiro,
985 ), somewhat simplistically argues that a large base of develop-
rs leads to a large number of applications that, in turn, leads to an
ncreasing number of end-users, and vice versa. As a result, by dif-
erentiating between the overall supply of applications and superstar
pplications, our study offers a more ﬁne-grained view of the compe-
ition between mobile ecosystems. 
.3. Implications for practice 
First, our observation that nucleus developers are active in multi-
oming implies that the market might be able to sustain more than
ne ecosystem, particularly if the ecosystems are able to focus on spe-
iﬁc customer segments and differentiate their offerings ( Kouris and
leer, 2012 ). This implies that several competing mobile application
cosystems can survive and exist in the future. 
Second, our ﬁndings imply that application marketplaces are not
sed to differentiating their ecosystem from that of competitors. The
esults of the content analysis show that the content of the most
nstalled applications are similar in the three leading mobile appli-
ations ecosystems. This supports the ﬁndings by Hyrynsalmi et al.
2013) who did not ﬁnd differentiation between the consumers nor
he application offerings of the ecosystems. In addition, our analysis
f the content of the most downloaded applications emphasizes the
mportance of games for attracting users to the marketplace. 
As a result, the similar value propositions in all three major
obile application ecosystems support the existence of multiple
latforms. This situation is similar to, for example, credit cards, where
ultiple competing credit card companies with very similar valueropositions co-exist. Hence, the mobile application marketplaces
re thus not a source of differentiation for the different platforms.
uture research could investigate whether the mobile application
arketplace could be a source of differentiation and how this could
e achieved. 
Third, based on our empirical ﬁndings, we question the number-
riven success metrics employed to evaluate mobile application
cosystems (e.g., Gupta, 2012; Reuters, 2012 ). Furthermore, as
ointed out by Hyrynsalmi et al. (2012) , only a small share of all ap-
lications published in the marketplace are actually downloaded, and
ven fewer are actually used by customers. In other words, customers
re either not interested in, or they do not notice, most of the content
vailable in the marketplace. 
As a result, we advise practitioners and researchers to pay increas-
ng attention to qualitative factors that enable the creation of suc-
essful application ecosystems (see e.g., Gonçalves and Ballon, 2011;
aton et al., 2015 ). In addition, we suggest ecosystem orchestrators
nd industry analysts move from counting the number of developers
n the market toward evaluating the value of each developer. 
Fourth and ﬁnally, our results further imply that nucleus de-
elopers’ bargaining power over ecosystem orchestrators is likely
o increase in the future. This is due to the fact that a few nucleus
evelopers create the applications that constitute the majority
f installations in the application marketplace. Hence, attracting
nd sustaining nucleus developers is essential for maintaining an
cosystem’s competitiveness. 
The ecosystem orchestrators can try to compensate for their lack
f attractiveness among developers by developing popular appli-
ations in-house. For example, Facebook applications for Windows
hone and Blackberry have been developed by the ecosystem orches-
rators instead of Facebook. Hence, the presence of the application
ppears to be even more important for the two ecosystem orchestra-
ors than it is for Facebook. 
Overall, since multi-homing is a common practice among nucleus
evelopers, creating a clearly differentiated application offering is
ery diﬃcult for ecosystem orchestrators. For application developers,
ur results imply that, despite the extra costs for porting the applica-
ion to other ecosystems, multi-homing seems to be a viable distri-
ution strategy. 
.4. Limitations and future research avenues 
As with any other, this study is subject to a number of limitations.
irst, the data were collected over a short period of time. Second,
he data gathering scripts were run from a server located in Finland.
herefore, particular applications that are available only for cus-
omers in, for example, the US might not have been shown due to
he location of the server we employed. Third, our study also omits
ompetition among multiple application stores serving the same
latform. For example, there are several application stores for the
ndroid platform. Due to the lack of porting costs, the competition
ynamics between application stores within an ecosystem are
ifferent from cross-ecosystem competition, and fall outside of the
cope of this study. Fourth, the utilized matching strategies are only
pproximations of the actual situation. 
Fifth, we employed the top application listings as a proxy of su-
erstars. The top listings change over time and are based on down-
oad numbers that do not reveal an application’s actual level of use.
or example, prior survey research indicates that mobile gaming is
ot of interest to customers (see e.g., Economides and Grousopoulou,
009; Bouwman, Carlsson, Castillo, Giaglis, and Walden, 2010;
uominen, Hyrynsalmi, and Knuutila, 2014 ). However, our results
how that games form the majority of the most installed applications.
his might be a result of a pattern whereby a user downloads several
ames, tries them all once, and then removes uninteresting ones from
he device. Furthermore, it is possible that all applications included in
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 the listings are not real superstars. For example, our data contained
eight ﬂashlight applications. Nevertheless, our approach to include
all top listed applications can be justiﬁed by the fact that we aimed
to include all potential superstars. Furthermore, the use of top appli-
cations lists omits developers that have many successful applications
but lack a superstar. The number of installations for each application
is available only on Google Play. We utilized this information and ex-
amined these kinds of developers, and demonstrated that the seller-
level multi-homing ratio is similar for developers identiﬁed based on
the listings of the most popular applications and by employing the
ﬁgures offered by Google play. 
Drawing on the implications and limitations of the present study,
we suggest three main avenues for future inquiry. First, we have ad-
vanced the model of Sun and Tse (2009) on the inﬂuence of multi-
homing in platform competition in two-sided markets in order to
capture the characteristics of mobile application ecosystems. To sup-
port the building of theories that illuminate the dynamics of busi-
ness ecosystems, we encourage further research on different kinds
of ecosystems. For example, the video game business shows similar
tendencies of being a multilevel two-sided market like the mobile
application market (c.f. Landsman and Stremersch, 2011 ). 
With regard to the second area of future research, a business
ecosystem should, among other success factors, support niche and
opportunity creation ( Iansiti and Levien 2004 ). However, we did not
address different aspects of niche creation inside an ecosystem when
discussing the numbers of developers and applications. As a result,
we encourage further research to create measures for niche and op-
portunity creation, and to investigate whether the size of an ecosys-
tem affects niche creation and the success of these niches. 
Third, future research could investigate whether the large number
of applications available in the marketplace adds value to the cus-
tomer through, for example, increased opportunities to select new
products and the pleasure obtained from browsing the selection, or
whether a large offering has an adverse effect due to increased search
costs. 
6. Conclusion 
This study assessed multi-homing in mobile application ecosys-
tems with a data of nearly 1.3 million applications from Apple’s App
Store, Google Play, and Windows Phone Store. The results demon-
strate that only a rather small subset of all applications and devel-
opers are multi-homing. However, among the most popular applica-
tions and their developers, the multi-homing rates are tenfold. Third,
we have shown that the value propositions of superstar applications
are rather similar between different ecosystems. 
The study advances our theoretical understanding of the inﬂu-
ence of multi-homing on competition between ecosystems by em-
phasizing the quality of the proposed content over the sheer size of
an ecosystem. The results also indicate that several competing mobile
application ecosystems can survive. 
Acknowledgments 
The authors wish to thank Ph.D. Ville Harkke, Ph.D. Kai Kimppa,
University teacher Antero Järvi, Associate Professor Marko Seppänen,
Adjunct Professor Timo Knuutila and D.Sc. Tuomas Mäkilä for discus-
sions on the topic as well as the unnamed reviewers for their insight-
ful comments on different versions of the manuscript. The authors
wish to express their gratitude to B.Sc Miika Oja-Nisula for his tech-
nical contributions in data gathering. Furthermore, Sami Hyrynsalmi
is grateful for the Nokia Foundation for ﬁnancial supporting of his
dissertation work on mobile ecosystems. This work was supported
by Academy of Finland with research grant (288609) awarded forhe project “Modeling Science and Technology Systems Through Mas-
ive Data Collections” (Suominen) and research grant (257412) “Dig-
tal Engagement: Uncovering the Customer Value of Social Media”
Mäntymäki). 
eferences 
rmstrong, M. , 2006. Competition in two-sided markets. The RAND J. Econ. 37 (3), 668–
691 . 
arnes, S.J. , 2002. The mobile commerce value chain: analysis and future develop-
ments. Int. J. Inf. Manag. 22 (2), 91–108 . 
asole, R.C. , 2009. Visualization of interﬁrm relations in a converging mobile ecosys-
tem. J. Inf. Technol. 24 (2), 144–159 . 
asole, R.C. , Karla, J. , 2011. On the evolution of mobile platform ecosystem structure
and strategy. Bus. Inf. Syst. Eng. 3, 313–322 . 
asole, R.C. , Karla, J. , 2012. Value transformation in the mobile service ecosystem: a
study of app store emergence and growth. Serv. Sci. 4 (1), 24–41 . 
asole, R.C. , Russel, M.G. , Huhtamäki, J. , Rubens, N. , 2012. Understanding mobile
ecosystem dynamics: a data-driven approach. In: Proceedings of International
Conference on Mobile Business. Association for Information Systems Paper 15 . 
osch, J. , 2009. From software product lines to software ecosystems. In: Proceedings of
the 13th International Software Product Line Conference (SPLC ’09). Pittsburgh, PA,
USA. Carnegie Mellon University, pp. 111–119 . 
oudreau, K. (2007). Too many complementors? Evidence on software developers . in:
Technical report, HEC-Paris School of Management. Working Paper Series, Social
Science Research Network. 
oudreau, K. , 2012. Let a thousand ﬂowers bloom? An early look at large
numbers of software app developers and patterns of innovation. Org. Sci. 23 (5),
1409–1427 . 
ouwman, H. , Carlsson, C. , Castillo, F.J.M. , Giaglis, G.M. , Walden, P. , 2010. Factors af-
fecting the present and future use of mobile data services: comparing the Dutch,
Finnish and Greek markets. Int. J. Mob. Commun. 8 (4), 430–450 . 
urkard, C. , Draisbach, T. , Widjaja, T. , Buxmann, P. , 2011. Software ecosystems: vendor-
sided characteristics of online marketplaces. Lecture Notes in Informatics. Infor-
matik 2011 . 
urkard, C. , Widjaja, T. , Buxmann, P. , 2012. Software ecosystems. Bus. Inf. Syst. Eng. 4
(1), 41–44 . 
ampbell, P.R.J. , Ahmed, F. , 2011. An assessment of mobile os-centric ecosystems. J.
Theor. Appl. Elec. Commer. Res. 6 (2), 50–62 . 
Castillo, C. , 2004. Effective web crawling. University of Chile Ph.D. thesis . 
enamor, J. , Usero, B. , Fernández, Z. , 2013. The role of complementary products on
platform adoption: evidence from the video console market. Technovation 33 (12),
405–416 . 
hen, B.X. (2010). Apple registers trademark for ‘there’s an app for that’. Wired.com, http:
//www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/10/app- for- that/ [last accessed on 03.04.2012.]
uadrado, F. , Dueñas, J. , 2012. Mobile application stores: success factors, existing ap-
proaches, and future developments. IEEE ASSP Mag. Commun. Mag. 50 (11), 160–
167 . 
edrick, J. , Kraemer, K.L. , Linden, G. , 2011. The distribution of value in the mobile phone
supply chain. Telecommun. Policy 35 (6), 505–521 . 
aton, B.D. , Elaluf-Calderwood, S. , Sørensen, C. , Yoo, Y. , 2015. Distributed tuning of
boundary resources: the Case of Apple’s iOS service system. MIS Quart. 39 (1), 217–
243 . 
conomides, A .A . , Grousopoulou, A . , 2009. Students’ thoughts about the importance
and costs of their mobile devices’ features and services. Telemat. Inf. 26 (1), 57–84 .
isenmann, T. , Parker, G. , Van Alstyne, M.W. , 2006. Strategies for two-sided markets.
Harvard Bus. Rev. 84 (10), 92–101 . 
unk, J.L. , 2009. The emerging value network in the mobile phone industry: the case of
japan and its implications for the rest of the world. Telecommun. Policy 33 (1&2),
4–18 . 
allager, S.R. , 2012. The battle of the blue laser DVDs: the signiﬁcance of corporate
strategy in standards battles. Technovation 32 (2), 90–98 . 
onçalves, V. , Ballon, P. , 2011. Adding value to the network: mobile operators’ experi-
ments with software-as-a-service and platform-as-a-service models. Telemat. Inf.
28 (1), 12–21 . 
ueguen, G. , Isckia, T. , 2011. The borders of mobile handset ecosystems: is coopetition
inevitable? Telemat. Inf. 28 (1), 5–11 . 
Gupta, P. (2012). Apple expected to unveil applications to take on google.
Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/11/us-apple-software-idUSBRE
85718V20120611 (accessed 08.06.12.). 
anssen, G.K. , 2012. A longitudinal case study of an emerging software ecosystem:
implications for practice and theory. J. Syst. Softw. 85 (7), 1455–1466 . 
e, Z.-L. , Lim, K. , Wong, P.-K. , 2006. Entry and competitive dynamics in the mobile
telecommunications market. Res. Policy 35 (8), 1147–1165 . 
einrich, T. , 2014. Standard wars, tied standards, and network externality induced path
dependence in the ICT sector. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 81, 309–320 . 
olzer, A. , Ondrus, J. , 2011. Mobile application market: a developer’s perspective.
Telemat. Inf. 28 (1), 22–31 . 
yrynsalmi, S. , Seppänen, M. , Suominen, A. , 2014. Sources of value in application
ecosystems. J. Syst. Softw. 96, 61–72 . 
yrynsalmi, S. , Suominen, A. , Mäkilä, T. , Knuutila, T. , 2012. The emerging mobile
ecosystems: an introductory analysis of android market. In: Proceedings of the 21st
International Conference on Management of Technology. International Association
for Management of Technology, Hsinchu, Taiwan . 
S. Hyrynsalmi et al. / The Journal of Systems and Software 111 (2016) 119–127 127 
H  
 
 
 
 
I
I  
 
 
J  
 
 
J  
 
 
J  
K  
K  
 
K  
L  
L  
 
 
L  
L  
L  
M  
 
M  
O
P  
P
P  
R  
R  
R  
S  
 
 
S  
 
S  
S  
T  
v  
 
v  
 
W  
Y  
 
 
S  
c  
i  
h  
f  
b
A  
T  
t  
l  
w
M  
o  
s  yrynsalmi, S. , Suominen, A. , Seppänen, M. , 2013. Differentation within mobile appli-
cation ecosystems — the unspecialized marketplaces. In: Zawislak, P.A., Hosni, Y.
(Eds.), Science, Technology and Innovation in the Emerging Markets Economy , Pro-
ceedings of 22nd International Conference of the International Association for
Management of Technology. International Association for Management of Tech-
nology, Porto Alegre, Brazil, pp. 1–17 paper no. 1569675111 . 
ansiti, M. , Levien, R. , 2004. Strategy as ecology. Harvard Bus. Rev. 82 (3), 68–78 . 
du, A. , van de Zande, T. , Jansen, S. , 2011. Multi-homing in the Apple ecosystem: why
and how developers target multiple Apple App Stores. In: Proceedings of Interna-
tional Conference on Management of Emergent Digital EcoSystems. New York, NY,
USA. MEDES ’11. ACM, pp. 122–128 . 
ansen, S. , Bloemendal, E. , 2013. Deﬁning app stores: the role of curated marketplaces
in software ecosystems. In: Herzwurm, G., Margaria, T. (Eds.), Software Business.
From Physical Products to Software Services and Solutions. Vol. 150 of Lecture
Notes in Business Information Processing. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 195–
206 . 
ansen, S. , Finkelstein, A. , Brinkkemper, S. , 2009. A sense of community: a research
agenda for software ecosystems. In: Proceedings of the 31st International Confer-
ence on Software Engineering - Companion Volume, ICSE-Companion 2009. IEEE,
pp. 187–190 . 
ärvi, K. , Kortelainen, S. , 2011. The dynamism of the two-sided application store market.
Int. J. Techno. Mark. 6 (1), 57–71 . 
atz, M.L. , Shapiro, C. , 1985. Network externalities, competition, and compatibility. The
American Econ. Rev. 75 (3), 424–440 . 
ouris, I. , Kleer, R. , 2012. Business models in two-sided markets: an assessment of
strategies for app platforms. In: Proceedings of International Conference on Mo-
bile Business 2012, ICMB’2012. Association for Information Systems„ pp. 1–12 . 
rippendorff, K. , 2013. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, third edi-
tion SAGE Publications . 
andsman, V. , Stremersch, S. , 2011. Multi-homing in two-sided markets: an empirical
inquiry in the video game console industry. J.Mark. 75 (6), 39–54 . 
augesen, J. , Yuan, Y. , 2010. What factors contributed to the success of Apple’s iPhone?
In: Proceedings of the 2010 Ninth International Conference on Mobile Busi-
ness/2010 Ninth Global Mobility Roundtable. ICMB-GMR ’10. Washington, DC, USA.
IEEE Computer Society, pp. 91–99 . 
ee, A. (2015). iOS Apps Generated More Revenue Than Hollywood Movies
Last Year. Readwrite, http://readwrite.com/2015/01/26/ios-app-development- 
hollywood-revenues-growth (accessed 13.02.15.). 
ee, B.G. , Lee, G.H. , Shim, Y.H. , Choi, A. , 2010. Let developers run into the app store by
lowering the barrier-to-entry. Int. J. Electron. Finan. 4 (3), 201–220 . 
evenshtein, V.I. , 1966. Binary codes capable of correcting deletions, insertions, and
reversals. Soviet Physics–Doklady 10 (8), 707–710 . 
aitland, C.F. , Bauer, J.M. , Westerveld, R. , 2002. The European market for mobile data:
evolving value chains and industry structures. Telecommun. Policy 26 (9&10), 485–
504 special issue: “Mapping the evolving telecommunications value chain & market
structure”. 
anikas, K. , Hansen, K.M. , 2013. Software ecosystems—a systematic literature review.
J. Syst. Softw. 86 (5), 1294–1306 . 
lston, C. , Najork, M. , 2010. Web crawling. Found. Trends Inf. Retr. 4 (3), 175–246 . 
arker, G. , Van Alstyne, M.W. , 2005. Two-sided network effects: a theory of information
product design. Manag. Sci. 51 (10), 1494–1504 . 
orter, M.E. , 2004. Competitive Advantage. Free Press . I  
Torter, M.E. , Millar, V.E. , 1985. How information gives you competitive advantage. Har-
vard Bus. Rev. 63 (4), 149–162 . 
euters (June 2012). Apple CEO Cook kicks off developers conference . Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/11/apple-developers-idUSL1E8HB4Z 
820120611 (accessed 08.12.12.). 
ochet, J.C. , Tirole, J. , 2003. Platform competition in two-sided markets. J. Eur. Econ.
Ass. 1 (4), 990–1029 . 
ochet, J.-C. , Tirole, J. , 2006. Two-sided markets: a progress report. The RAND J. Econ.
37 (3), 645–667 . 
chultz, N. , Zarnekow, R. , Wulf, J. , Nguyen, Q.-T. , 2011. The new role of developers in
the mobile ecosystem: an Apple and Google case study. In: Proceedings of the 15th
International Conference on Intelligence in Next Generation Networks (ICIN). IEEE,
pp. 103–108 . 
mith, D. (2015). Google Play has more apps than Apple now, but it’s still
behind in one key area. Bus. Insider UK, http://uk.businessinsider.com/
google-play-vs-apple-app-store-2015-2 (accessed 13.02.15.). 
un, M. , Tse, E. , 2009. The resource-based view of competitive advantage in two-sided
markets. J. Manag. Stud. 46 (1), 45–64 . 
uominen, A. , Hyrynsalmi, S. , Knuutila, T. , 2014. Young mobile users: radical and indi-
vidual − Not. Telemat. Inf. 31 (2), 266–281 . 
se, E. , 2006. The diffusion of competing technology standards. In: Proceedings of
Academy of Management, 2006. Academy of Management, pp. C1–C6 . 
an de Kaa, G, de Vries, H.J., 2015. Factors for winning format battles: a compara-
tive case study. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change, 91 222–235. doi: 10.1016/j.techfore.
2014.02.019 . 
an de Kaa, G. , van den Ende, J. , de Vries, H.J. , van Heck, E. , 2011. Factors for winning
interface format battles: a review and synthesis of the literature. Technol. Forecast.
Soc. Change 78 (8), 1397–1411 . 
est, J. , Mace, M. , 2010. Browsing as the killer app: explaining the rapid success of
Apple’s iPhone. Telecommun. Policy 34 (5&6), 270–286 . 
amakami, T. , 2010. A mobile digital ecosystem framework: lessons from the evolution
of mobile data services. In: Proceedings of the 2010 13th International Conference
on Network-Based Information Systems. Washington, DC, USA. NBIS ’10. IEEE Com-
puter Society, pp. 516–520 . 
ami Hyrynsalmi is a nerd who has always enjoyed working with programming and
omputers. After graduating as Master of Science in Technology in software engineer-
ng from University of Turku in 2009, he decided to focus on the real issues and started
is doctoral dissertation work on mobile application ecosystems. After successfully de-
ending his thesis in 2014, he has focused on various themes from software security to
usiness ecosystems. 
rho Suominen is Senior Scientist at the Innovations, Economy, and Policy unit at VTT
echnical Research Centre of Finland. His research focuses on qualitative and quanti-
ative assessment of emerging technologies and innovation management. He has pub-
ished work in several journals such as Scientometrics, Journal of Systems and Soft-
are, and Futures. 
atti Mäntymäki is an Academy of Finland post-doctoral researcher at Turku School
f Economics, Finland. He holds a D.Sc. (Econ. & Bus. Adm) in information systems
cience. His research has been published in outlets such as International Journal of
nformation Management, Computers in Human Behavior and Behavior & Information
echnology. 
